Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-76fb5796d-25wd4 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-04-25T11:05:57.833Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

11 - The market for migrants

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 December 2011

F. H. Buckley
Affiliation:
George Mason University
Jagdeep S. Bhandari
Affiliation:
Southern Methodist University, Texas
Alan O. Sykes
Affiliation:
University of Chicago
Get access

Summary

One of the most important kinds of international trade is the trade in people that occurs when states compete for immigrants. Valuable immigrants confer great benefits on immigration state natives, and impose costs on emigration state natives. For value-decreasing immigrants, the direction of the wealth transfer is reversed. Because of this, both immigration and emigration states have a strong incentive to compete for valuable immigrants.

Too little attention has been paid to the market for migrants in the current debate over American immigration policy. Immigration opponents have argued for sharp reductions in the number of immigrants, and immigration advocates have argued for open borders. What is often missing from both sides is an acknowledgment that some immigrants are value-increasing, and some not, and that the goal of immigration policies should be to attract the former and repel the latter. In this respect, the United States has fared less well in the market for migrants than rival immigration states such as Canada.

This chapter argues that the United States should compete more effectively in the market for migrants. It should widen its doors to valuable immigrants, and close them to value-decreasing ones. Current proposals to cut welfare benefits to recent immigrants might usefully deter unwanted immigrants, but do not closely address the need to attract valuable immigrants. To do this, the United States should emulate Canada's immigration screening program. Under the Canadian “points” system, economic and some family preference immigrants are screened for the economic benefits they will confer on their host country.

Type
Chapter
Information
Economic Dimensions in International Law
Comparative and Empirical Perspectives
, pp. 405 - 448
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 1998

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure coreplatform@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×