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Chapter 3 - Why Science Succeeds, and Sometimes Doesn’t

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  19 December 2019

Robert J. Sternberg
Affiliation:
Cornell University, New York
Diane F. Halpern
Affiliation:
Claremont McKenna College, California
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Summary

Psychology is part of a larger problem of science today. Science is simultaneously under-appreciated and lacking in credibility. The latter exacerbates the former but does not fully explain it. The credibility problems take many forms, from unreplicable results to outright fraud. A partial solution to both problems is to step back and consider science as an application of actively open-minded thinking (AOT). AOT is a standard for good thinking (both critical and constructive), which is designed to avoid common deficiencies such as bias toward pet conclusions and overconfidence in conclusions reached so far. In AOT, search for evidence, alternatives and goals is fair, and confidence is based on what has been achieved so far. AOT is consistent with ideal scientific practice. Since AOT also provides a standard for evaluation of sources when people cannot think through everything on their own, the dependence of science on AOT ought to inspire trust in its conclusions (including their uncertainties). Yet, scientific practice can be improved in ways that make science conform more closely to the standards of AOT, such as thinking of itself as asking questions rather than testing predictions.

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Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2020

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