Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-76fb5796d-vfjqv Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-04-25T08:38:54.062Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

1 - Managing Conflicts of Interest within Organizations: Does Activating Social Values Change the Impact of Self-Interest on Behavior?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 August 2010

Tom R. Tyler
Affiliation:
New York University School of Law
Don A. Moore
Affiliation:
Carnegie Mellon University, Pennsylvania
Daylian M. Cain
Affiliation:
Carnegie Mellon University, Pennsylvania
George Loewenstein
Affiliation:
Carnegie Mellon University, Pennsylvania
Max H. Bazerman
Affiliation:
Harvard University, Massachusetts
Get access

Summary

ABSTRACT

Many organizational conflicts involve tensions between a person's motivation to act in their own self-interest and the efforts to authorities, rules, and institutions to bring people's conduct into line with social values involving justice and morality. This chapter explores the manner in which people in organizational settings manage personal conflicts between their self-interest and their views about what is just or moral. Past explorations of people's behavior in mixed-motive situations presents behavior as developing from a balancing of self-interested and moral/justice-based motivations. In contrast, the approach used here – the social value activation model – focuses on the consequences of activating social values. The results of several studies suggest that self-interested and ethical motivations interact, that is, once people's ethical motivations are activated they subsequently give less weight to calculations of personal self-interest when making behavioral decisions. Implications for the management of conflicts of interest in organizations are explored.

When people make decisions within organizations, they are often faced with conflicting motivations. One motivation is to act in ways that benefit themselves and/or the groups to which they belong in the immediate situation – the motive of personal or group self-interest. This motivation is often partially or even completely at odds with the motivation to make decisions in ways that are consistent with their justice-based or moral values. Hence, people have to trade off between their concerns about their self-interest and their desire to act based on their judgments about what is just and/or morally right.

Type
Chapter
Information
Conflicts of Interest
Challenges and Solutions in Business, Law, Medicine, and Public Policy
, pp. 13 - 35
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2005

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Barrett-Howard, E., & Tyler, T. R. (1986). Procedural justice as a criterion on allocation decisions. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 50, 296–304CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fiske, A. P., & Tetlock, P. E. (1997). Taboo trade-offs: Reactions to transactions that transgress the spheres of justice. Political Psychology, 18, 255–297, p. 278CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Frey, B. S. (1997). Not just for the money. Cheltenham, England: Edward Elgar
Hollander-Blumoff, R., & Tyler, T. R. (2004). Fairness issues in bilateral negotiation. Unpublished manuscript, New York University
Huo, Y. J., Smith, H. J., Tyler, T. R., Lind, E. A. (1996). Superordinate identification, subgroup identification, and justice concerns: Is spearatism the problem; is assimilation the answer? Psychological Science, Vol. 7(1) (Jan 1996): 40–45CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kopelman, S., Weber, J. M., & Messick, D. M. (2002). Factors influencing cooperation in commons dilemmas: A review of experimental psychological research. In E. Ostrom, T. Dietz, N. Dolsak, P. C. Stern, S. Stonich, & E. U. Weber (Eds.), The drama of the commons. Washington, DC: National Academy Press, (pp. 113–156)
MacCoun, R. (1993). Drugs and the law. Psychological Bulletin, 113, 497–512CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Messick, D. M., & Sentis, K. P. (1985). Estimating social and nonsocial utility functions from ordinal data. European Journal of Social Psychology, 15, 389–399CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Poundstone, W. (1992). Prisoner's dilemma. New York: Doubleday
Sondak, H., & Tyler, T. R. (2004). A relational perspective on the desirability of markets. Unpublished manuscript, University of Utah
Tyler, T. R. (1990). Why people obey the law. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press
Tyler, T. R. (2004). Process utility and help seeking: What do people want from experts? Unpublished manuscript, New York University
Tyler, T. R., & Blader, S. L. (2000). Cooperation in groups. Philadelphia: Psychology Press
Tyler, T. R., & Blader, S. L. (2004). Can businesses effectively regulate employee conduct? The antecedents of rule following in work settings. Unpublished manuscript, New York University
Tyler, T. R., Boeckmann, R. J., Smith, H. J., & Huo, Y. J. (1997). Social justice in a diverse society. Boulder, CO: Westview
Tyler, T. R., & Huo, Y. J. (2002). Trust in the law. New York: Russell Sage

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure coreplatform@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×