We have in the previous chapter described and defended the merits of security conceived of as a thick public good and suggested that the practical realization of such a conception requires that security in some significant measure be publicly provided. In staking out that position we argued for the indispensability of the social in the generation and sustenance of individual security, and for the indispensability of some constitutive idea of ‘publicness’ and of political community to the full flowering of the social – conditions required even if we want the provision of individual security to be tailored to ends whose value may be calculated in strictly individual terms. But an additional level of argument has to be negotiated before we can allocate the state a primary role in the provision of security so conceived. In particular, we must face two further challenges and address two further series of questions. First, why and with reference to what particular tasks or functions should any particular public entity be allocated a pre-eminent or primary role, or – as we prefer for reasons we explain in due course – take priority in the matter of security provision? And if we conclude that some such entity should indeed be allocated such a role and if we decide what form such priority ought to take, why need the entity in question be the state rather than some other species of political community? Secondly, even if we can make a persuasive prima facie case for the priority of the state, we still have to deal with and overcome its propensity towards meddling, favouritism, monoculturalism and stupidity.