In both world wars Britain pursued harsh attritional strategies towards Germany. Naval blockade in the First World War and strategic bombing in the Second were both effective in causing serious damage to the enemy’s infrastructure, economy and morale, but neither was in itself decisive. The naval blockade caused hardship, bordering on starvation, for the civil population, particularly women, children and the elderly, but was not much criticised in Britain, either at the time or later. In sharp contrast, strategic bombing, though generally popular during the war, has been subjected to bitter criticism in recent decades, even to the extent of being labelled a war crime. This chapter examines the development and impact of the strategy of blockade in the broad context of deciding the outcome of the First World War, and seeks to explain the contrasting reactions of public opinion.

Historically naval blockade had been a key element in British naval power with the aim of denying seaborne commerce to Continental enemies. The policy and strategy of blockade remained very attractive to the government and the Royal Navy before 1914 and had an influential spokesperson in Maurice Hankey, Secretary of the Committee of Imperial Defence. This exercise of superior naval power would be much cheaper and more popular than raising a large army and, in addition to its economic effects, would have the equally important consequence of forcing the German High Seas Fleet to seek a decisive battle in the North Sea.