Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-8448b6f56d-qsmjn Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-04-19T21:28:23.225Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

2 - The Southwest Pacific Area: Military Strategy and Operations, 1944–45

from PART 1 - STRATEGY

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 December 2015

Peter J. Dean
Affiliation:
Australian National University, Canberra
Kevin Holzimmer
Affiliation:
US Air Force Research Institute
Peter J. Dean
Affiliation:
Australian National University, Canberra
Get access

Summary

On Thursday 7 October 1943 two senior officers, one Australian and one American, held meetings in their respective headquarters. Even though some 2000 kilometres of the Coral Sea separated them, they were linked by a common cause and a common role. They were both senior operations officers of their respective headquarters in the Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA). US Brigadier-General Stephen Chamberlin was the senior operations officer for General Douglas MacArthur, the theatre Commander-in-Chief (C-in-C). The Australian Major-General Frank Berryman was the Deputy Chief of the General Staff responsible to the C-in-C General Sir Thomas Blamey, while concurrently also holding down the position of senior staff officer of New Guinea Force (NGF), the Australian Army formation fighting the Japanese in New Guinea.

On the morning of 7 October, Berryman sat in a tropical bungalow in Port Moresby, Papua, that served as the headquarters of NGF. Across from him sat Lieutenant-General Iven Mackay, or ‘Mister Chips’, as he was known, whom Blamey had installed as the General Officer-in-Command (GOC-in-C) New Guinea Force six weeks earlier. With them was Lieutenant-General Leslie Morshead, the ‘hero of Tobruk and El Alamein’ and commander of II Australian Corps.

Despite the fact that the three men had served together in the Australian Army for decades, had a close rapport and a high degree of mutual respect for one another, the atmosphere was tense. Morshead was about to fly out to relieve Lieutenant-General Edmund Herring of his command. Herring was the commander of I Corps, whose troops were in the frontline in the Markham Valley and Huon Peninsula fighting the Japanese. Berryman had held reservations over Herring's suitability for his command for some months and in September, after Herring had mishandled relations with the Americans, lost ‘grip’ of his operations and openly criticised Mackay, Berryman advised Blamey that he lad lost all confidence in him. He told Blamey that he did not think that Herring was ‘tough enough mentally’ for the job. Major-General Vasey, General Officer Commanding (GOC) of the 7th Australian Division in Herring's Corps was even more frank. He recorded that Herring's ‘trouble is a lack of decision occasioned by a lack of knowledge and combined with wishful thinking and optimism’. He is ‘incapable of training a staff … [and] good deal of our recent problems are his doing … Ned is a nice man but the army is not the place for those people’.

Type
Chapter
Information
Australia 1944–45
Victory in the Pacific
, pp. 28 - 50
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2015

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Dean, Peter J., The Architect of Victory: The Military Career of Lieutenant-General Sir Frank Horton Berryman, Cambridge University Press, Melbourne, 2011.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cannon, M. Hamlin, Leyte: The Return to the Philippines, Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, Washington, DC, 1954.Google Scholar
Holzimmer, Kevin, General Walter Krueger: Unsung Hero of the Pacific War, University Press of Kansas, Kansas, 2007.Google Scholar
Horner, David, High Command: Australia's Struggle for an Independent War Strategy, 1939–1945, Allen & Unwin, St Leonards, 1992.Google Scholar
Horner, David, Blamey: The commander in Chief, Allen & Unwin, St Leonards, 1998.Google Scholar
Long, Gavin, The Final Campaigns, Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 1963.Google Scholar
Smith, Robert Ross, Triumph in the Philippines, Office of the Chief of Military History, Deptartment of the Army, Washington, DC, 1963Google Scholar
Taaffe, Stephen R., MacArthur's Jungle War: The 1944 New Guinea Campaign, University Press of Kansas, Kansas, 1998.Google Scholar

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure coreplatform@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×