This chapter looks at how the Indonesian government under Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) succeeded in finding a resolution to the armed conflict that had raged for almost three decades in Aceh. After a short overview on the causes of conflict and its main stages, a number of failed peace initiatives are discussed. The main attention in the first section is on the Helsinki peace process that resulted in a memorandum of understanding (MoU) between the Indonesian government and the Aceh separatists and formed the basis for the ongoing peace process in Aceh. The second section discusses the process leading up to the highly controversial Law on the Governing of Aceh, which served to implement the MoU's stipulations but fell short of doing so in many respects. The concluding remarks reflect on the extent to which SBY's foreign policy decision-making helped bring a preliminary and, hopefully, sustainable end to thirty years of violent conflict in Aceh.

SBY's strong motivation to end the Aceh conflict as expressed in the above quote must not be solely seen as part of his overall presidential agenda to improve Indonesia's international reputation from 2004 onwards. His involvement in supporting dialogue to end the Aceh conflict started way before he campaigned for presidency and finally took office as Indonesia's fifth president in September 2004. The Cessation of Hostilities Agreement by which GAM and Indonesia had tried to negotiate a lasting solution collapsed in May 2003. Only shortly after, Jusuf Kalla (then Coordinating Minister for People's Welfare), in a closed meeting, proposed to then President Megawati Sukarnoputri in the presence of Gen. Endriartono Sutarto (then TNI Commander-in-Chief) and SBY (then Coordinating Minister for Security and Politics) to take another attempt to engage GAM in dialogue. All participants of this meeting gave at least oral support of his endeavour. This came as no surprise as SBY himself had long believed that “conflict had gone on too long; there were too many victims on both sides. And it was expensive, costing us about $130 million per year in security operations” (Morfit 2007, p. 125).