My argument is that if China continues to grow economically, it will translate that economic might into military might, and it will become involved in an intense security competition with the United States, similar to the security competition that existed between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. That intense security competition, in my opinion, is unavoidable.… Why should we expect that China won't have a Monroe Doctrine, when we have a Monroe Doctrine?… I think that we'll go to considerable lengths to slow down Chinese economic growth.
[T]he center of gravity in Asian regionalism has shifted over the past decade from trans-Pacific forums to pan-Asian venues. The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation has been largely supplanted by ASEAN+3 as the locus of practical projects to foster Asian trade liberalization and monetary cooperation. At the same time, multilateral trade negotiations—in which the United States has historically played a central role—have lost momentum, while bilateral and regional free trade agreements among Asians have rapidly proliferated.… [All this] suggests that the United States is heading for a more modest role in Northeast Asia. The relative power of others is expanding; U.S. interest and influence in the region appears to have waned.
The U.S. position in Asia is founded on several strategic realities that have changed little over the years. Most Northeast and Southeast Asian countries want a strong U.S. role, including especially a military presence, in the region to balance China and Japan.