Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface and Acknowledgments
- Introduction : An Approach to a Branch of Logic
- Theorizing about reasoning and argument
- Fallacies and asymmetries
- Critiques
- Historical analyses
- 18 The Concept of Ad Hominem Argument in Galileo and Locke (1974)
- 19 Newton's Third Rule of Philosophizing : A Role for Logic in Historiography (1974)
- 20 Logic and Rhetoric in Lavoisier's Sealed Note : Toward a Rhetoric of Science (1977)
- 21 The Concept of Judgment and Huygens' Theory of Gravity (1980)
- 22 Empiricism, Judgment, and Argument : Toward an Informal Logic of Science (1988)
- 23 Criticism, Reasoning, and Judgment in Science (1995)
- Selected Bibliography
- Index
23 - Criticism, Reasoning, and Judgment in Science (1995)
from Historical analyses
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 February 2015
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface and Acknowledgments
- Introduction : An Approach to a Branch of Logic
- Theorizing about reasoning and argument
- Fallacies and asymmetries
- Critiques
- Historical analyses
- 18 The Concept of Ad Hominem Argument in Galileo and Locke (1974)
- 19 Newton's Third Rule of Philosophizing : A Role for Logic in Historiography (1974)
- 20 Logic and Rhetoric in Lavoisier's Sealed Note : Toward a Rhetoric of Science (1977)
- 21 The Concept of Judgment and Huygens' Theory of Gravity (1980)
- 22 Empiricism, Judgment, and Argument : Toward an Informal Logic of Science (1988)
- 23 Criticism, Reasoning, and Judgment in Science (1995)
- Selected Bibliography
- Index
Summary
Bohr: Critical Thinking versus Logical Thinking
In his autobiography, physicist Otto R. Frisch tells the following revealing anecdote about Niels Bohr. Bohr, we are told, “never trusted a purely formal or mathematical argument. ‘No, no’ he would say ‘You are not thinking; you are just being logical’ ” (Frisch 1979, 95). It would be arbitrary and uncharitable to interpret Bohr's point as implying that being logical is not a form of thinking. Rather it seems obvious that he is distinguishing between two types of thinking, logical thinking and another kind which may be appropriately labeled critical thinking. By logical thinking here Bohr seems to mean a mental activity which progresses from one thought to another in accordance with strict rules, namely rules that are clear, distinct, and exact. It might be better to call such thinking formal, or algorithmic, or deductive, in order not to limit the concept of logic to a one-sided and prejudicial conception. However, I do not want to focus on that, but rather on the other type of thinking. It is obvious from the context that critical thinking is different from logical thinking, not in the sense of being illogical, but rather in the sense that either it follows no rules or it follows rules that are not formal. One may speak of informal judgment to refer to this feature of critical thinking being suggested here.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Arguments about ArgumentsSystematic, Critical, and Historical Essays In Logical Theory, pp. 409 - 430Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2005