INTRODUCTION

The fact that one desires something does not suffice to establish that one ought to pursue it. The fact that a course of action appears good from a certain perspective does not guarantee that this course of action is in fact good. Insofar as the agent is rational, she evaluates the reliability of various perspectives on reflection and tries to come up with a coherent understanding of what she should pursue. Thus drawing on all particular perspectives, the agent forms a reflective perspective that underwrites what I call the agent's “general conception of the good.” Section 2.2 presents, and discusses the importance of, a notion of a general conception of the good.

A perfectly rational agent would always act in accordance with his conception of the good. However, an imperfectly rational agent could have a certain general view of the good and yet act otherwise; an imperfectly rational agent could form an intention at odds with his general conception of the good. According to the scholastic view, what the agent judges to be good is the agent's intention in action. Given that the scholastic view identifies desires with appearances of the good in part because what makes them mere appearances is the fact that they ought to be evaluated from a reflective perspective, it is indeed natural for the scholastic view to identify intentions with judgments of the good. However, this kind of identification has been the subject of various criticisms.