Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Dedication
- Contents
- List of Figures
- Acknowledgments
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Irregular Warfare 101
- Part One The American Revolution to Chasing Sandino, 1776–1930s
- Part Two The Cold War, 1940s–1989
- Part Three Latin America and the Cold War, 1950s–1980s
- Part Four Post–Cold War, 1990s–2000s
- Notes
- Bibliography
- Index
2 - Irregular Warfare 101
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 July 2014
- Frontmatter
- Dedication
- Contents
- List of Figures
- Acknowledgments
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Irregular Warfare 101
- Part One The American Revolution to Chasing Sandino, 1776–1930s
- Part Two The Cold War, 1940s–1989
- Part Three Latin America and the Cold War, 1950s–1980s
- Part Four Post–Cold War, 1990s–2000s
- Notes
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
Victory through policy is as much a mark of the good general as victory by the sword.
– Julius CaesarIf one side uses force without compunction, undeterred by the bloodshed it involves, while the other side refrains, the first will gain the upper hand. That side will force the other to follow suit; each will drive its opponent toward extremes, and the only limiting factors are the counterpoises inherent in war. This is how the matter must be seen. It would be futile – even wrong – to try and shut one’s eyes to what war really is from sheer distress at its brutality.
– Prussian military philosopher, Carl von Clausewitz, 1820sDefining Counterinsurgency, Insurgency, Guerrilla Warfare, and Terrorism
Most contemporary discussions of irregular warfare concentrate on three core concepts – counterinsurgency, insurgency, and guerrilla warfare – and this book proceeds in that convention. Let’s begin by setting out definitions of each of these concepts. A counterinsurgency, quite simply, is defined as all measures adopted to suppress an insurgency. When we say a state is engaged in counterinsurgency, we generally mean that it is attempting to use some combination of political, administrative, military, psychological, and civic actions to maintain the status quo against an insurgent force that is trying to upend that order. To cite a well-known example, Fulgencio Batista’s regime in late-1950s Cuba waged a counterinsurgency to maintain its ascendancy while confronted with Fidel Castro’s ragtag rebel band in the Sierra Maestra mountains. Counterinsurgent forces can usually count on superior armies and overall might; however, they are not always able to count on the support of the civilian population – often a crucial factor in the outcome of this class of conflicts. In both political and military terms, counterinsurgencies tend to adapt to the nature of the insurgent threat. That is, the insurgents tend to determine the “rules of the game” and the style of fighting. Or, as one military theorist has surmised, “[as] insurrection changes, so does counterinsurgency.” Almost by definition, then, one must first understand an insurgency before understanding its counterinsurgent response.
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- Information
- America's Dirty WarsIrregular Warfare from 1776 to the War on Terror, pp. 15 - 26Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2014