Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Acknowledgments
- Introduction
- PART I TERRORISM: WHAT'S IN A NAME?
- PART II WHY MORAL CONDEMNATIONS OF TERRORISM LACK CREDIBILITY
- PART III DEFENDING NONCOMBATANT IMMUNITY
- PART IV HOW MUCH IMMUNITY SHOULD NONCOMBATANTS HAVE?
- Introduction: the problem of collateral damage
- 17 The problem of collateral damage killings
- 18 The ethics of collateral damage killings
- Conclusion: terrorism and the ethics of war
- Bibliography
- Index
18 - The ethics of collateral damage killings
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 June 2012
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Acknowledgments
- Introduction
- PART I TERRORISM: WHAT'S IN A NAME?
- PART II WHY MORAL CONDEMNATIONS OF TERRORISM LACK CREDIBILITY
- PART III DEFENDING NONCOMBATANT IMMUNITY
- PART IV HOW MUCH IMMUNITY SHOULD NONCOMBATANTS HAVE?
- Introduction: the problem of collateral damage
- 17 The problem of collateral damage killings
- 18 The ethics of collateral damage killings
- Conclusion: terrorism and the ethics of war
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
The strongest criticism of the precautionary principle is that it allows actions that are morally on a par with reckless behavior. From the perspective of the foreseeable harm principle, the precautionary principle permits attackers to consciously disregard foreseeable harms to civilians and thus approves actions that display a callous indifference to civilian lives. In this chapter I will defend the precautionary principle against these powerful and troubling charges. I will also discuss the principle of proportionality and will argue that, while it plays a role in evaluating collateral damage killings, it must be used as a supplement to the precautionary principle rather than a sufficient principle in itself.
DOES THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE APPROVE OF RECKLESS BEHAVIOR?
Contrary to the criticism that the precautionary principle permits reckless killings of civilians, a good case can be made for the view that, if wartime attacks are preceded by serious precautions, they are not reckless, even if they foreseeably kill or injure civilians. This possibility is clearly suggested by the Model Penal Code. It says that a person acts recklessly when he
consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that … will result from his conduct. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that … its disregard involves a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a law-abiding person would observe in the actor's situation. (Emphasis added.)
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Terrorism and the Ethics of War , pp. 269 - 287Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2010