Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Acknowledgments
- 1 The species problem
- 2 The transformation of Aristotle
- 3 Linnaeus and the naturalists
- 4 Darwin and the proliferation of species concepts
- 5 The division of conceptual labor solution
- 6 Species and the metaphysics of evolution
- 7 Meaning, reference and conceptual change
- 8 Conclusion
- Bibliography
- Index
7 - Meaning, reference and conceptual change
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 04 April 2011
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Acknowledgments
- 1 The species problem
- 2 The transformation of Aristotle
- 3 Linnaeus and the naturalists
- 4 Darwin and the proliferation of species concepts
- 5 The division of conceptual labor solution
- 6 Species and the metaphysics of evolution
- 7 Meaning, reference and conceptual change
- 8 Conclusion
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
MEANING AND REFERENCE
I have so far been engaged in two projects. The first project, carried out in the first four chapters, is descriptive and aimed at understanding the many different ways of thinking about species from Aristotle to modern systematics. The second project, carried out in chapters 5 and 6, is primarily prescriptive, aimed at understanding how we should think about species – given what evolutionary theory tells us about them. One insight of the prescriptive project, based on the idea of the division of conceptual labor, is that to understand and evaluate a species concept we need to look at a level above the concept, into how that concept functions within a particular conceptual framework. But we can also look at the nature and functioning of an individual species concept. In part, this means understanding how the term species has meaning and refers to things in the world. To do so, we will first look at some standard philosophical views about concepts – what they are and how they work. What we shall find is a complex feedback process between meaning and reference, a definitional structure and reference potential determined by theory, a set of social factors relating to the social structure of science, and a set of practical values governing the use of the term species. We will first begin with a brief sketch of some prominent philosophical views about concepts.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- The Species ProblemA Philosophical Analysis, pp. 178 - 204Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2010