INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this Chapter is providing an in-depth examination of the idea of human dignity as the normative foundation of human rights. In particular, it seeks to analysis and show if and in what sense the principle of human dignity can and should be regarded as an underlying normative justification of ESC rights as inherent and universally valid human rights. But as noted in Chapter three above, defending human dignity as the normative foundation of human rights requires us to show, first, that it is itself an inherent (intrinsic) moral value of every human being; second, that it is present in each and every human being equally, unconditionally and at all-time; and, finally, that it is regarded as a universal moral value. Before doing this, it's important to first address the controversy affecting the notion of human dignity. On the one hand, the idea of human dignity holds a central place in human rights law, constitutional law, and jurisprudence. It has received an increasing attention in other fields including in moral and political philosophy. It is a common phrase in social protest, activism and political rhetoric. In human rights law, it is regarded by many as a fundamental normative principle upon which inherent human rights are universally justified. On the other hand, there is no or little consensus on its normative meaning, status and function both in theory and practice. In fact, some authors reject the assertion that human dignity is a foundation of universal human rights. For them, the popularity of the term in academic writing and practice conceals the existence of deep disagreement on what it entails not only between different legal systems but even within a given legal system. There are even authors who argue that the term dignity is nothing but a mere place holder or a useless concept employed by tribunals to limit legitimate democratic conversation on important societal issues.

However, it will be seen that the controversies or disagreements surrounding human dignity have, by and large, more to do with the competing historicalphilosophical construction of the term than its current practical usage.