Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Acknowledgments
- Introduction
- 1 Theories
- 2 Internal and External Virtues
- 3 Explanation
- 4 Confirmation
- 5 Underdetermination
- 6 Observation
- 7 Blurring the Internal–External Distinction
- 8 Coherence and Truth
- 9 Objective Evidence
- 10 Science and Common Sense
- Glossary of Terms
- Suggested Reading
- Index
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Acknowledgments
- Introduction
- 1 Theories
- 2 Internal and External Virtues
- 3 Explanation
- 4 Confirmation
- 5 Underdetermination
- 6 Observation
- 7 Blurring the Internal–External Distinction
- 8 Coherence and Truth
- 9 Objective Evidence
- 10 Science and Common Sense
- Glossary of Terms
- Suggested Reading
- Index
Summary
All of this scrutiny of the scientific process got started and has been driven along by the question, Why believe that what science says of the world is true? This is the appropriate time to face up to the question and call on the description that has been built of how science moves to gauge its movement toward the truth. The question is of the accuracy of the scientific description of the world. To put it in a more realistic form and in a form more amenable to constructive answers, ask which aspects of the scientific description are accurate. And, most important as a general evaluative tool, we are interested in knowing a method by which to tell the true from the false. What is it about the process of science that we should attend to as the reliable, responsible process of justification that issues warrant for belief?
This question has been refined somewhat in light of the guidelines that have developed through the description of science in action. From reviewing the practical and conceptual limitations on the activities of explanation, confirmation, and observation, restrictions on the nature of justification have emerged. There is no compromising on the goal, though. Justification is still supposed to be the indicator of truth, or at least likelihood of truth, and there is nothing fancy or philosophical in the notion of truth. It's just plain old truth we are talking about.
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- Information
- Reading the Book of NatureAn Introduction to the Philosophy of Science, pp. 135 - 158Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 1992