Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of figures
- List of abbreviations
- Preface
- 1 Introduction
- Part I History of the understanding of stratospheric ozone
- Part II Philosophical issues arising from the history
- 9 Prediction in science
- 10 The crucial experiment
- 11 Positive and negative evidence in theory selection
- 12 Branches and sub-branches of science: problems at disciplinary boundaries
- 13 Scientific evidence and powerful computers: new problems for philosophers of science?
- 14 The scientific consensus
- References
- Index
10 - The crucial experiment
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 22 September 2009
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of figures
- List of abbreviations
- Preface
- 1 Introduction
- Part I History of the understanding of stratospheric ozone
- Part II Philosophical issues arising from the history
- 9 Prediction in science
- 10 The crucial experiment
- 11 Positive and negative evidence in theory selection
- 12 Branches and sub-branches of science: problems at disciplinary boundaries
- 13 Scientific evidence and powerful computers: new problems for philosophers of science?
- 14 The scientific consensus
- References
- Index
Summary
When an area of scientific understanding and investigation seems to take a major change in direction or make a sudden leap forward, there is often talk of a ‘crucial experiment’. The idea is that the change can largely, or perhaps entirely be attributed to insights which came from the result of a single decisive experiment. It is clear that this is not always the case. Philosophers and scientists have disagreed widely as to whether it occurs frequently, rarely, or not at all.
There are at least two reasons why an experiment that was not really crucial might be constructed as a ‘crucial experiment’ after the event in telling the history. Firstly, it can add drama and colour to the story. Secondly, it gives an opportunity to clarify some of the confusion and ambiguity that would probably have been present at the time. The logical foundations of the present understanding of the subject can then be more clearly linked in with the history.
The ‘crucial experiment’ has been characterised as follows: it must give a result that is simultaneously in accord with a clear prediction of one scientific theory, and in contradiction of the clear predictions of all of its serious current rivals. This definition is given both by Lakatos (1974) and Franklin (1981).
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- The Ozone LayerA Philosophy of Science Perspective, pp. 93 - 121Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2001