Book contents
- On Helping One’s Neighbor
- Reviews
- Series page
- On Helping One’s Neighbor
- Copyright page
- Dedication
- Contents
- Preface
- Acknowledgments
- Abbreviations
- 1 Religious Ethics and Obligations to Others
- 2 Universalism and Relativism, Minimalism and Maximalism
- 3 Institutions, Severe Poverty, and the Obligations of Affluence
- 4 On Helping One’s Neighbor
- 5 Moral Demandingness and Obligations to Special Relations and Self
- Conclusion
- Coda
- Appendix I
- Appendix II: Dignity, Indeterminateness of Sense, and Human Rights
- Bibliography
- Index
4 - On Helping One’s Neighbor
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 04 April 2024
- On Helping One’s Neighbor
- Reviews
- Series page
- On Helping One’s Neighbor
- Copyright page
- Dedication
- Contents
- Preface
- Acknowledgments
- Abbreviations
- 1 Religious Ethics and Obligations to Others
- 2 Universalism and Relativism, Minimalism and Maximalism
- 3 Institutions, Severe Poverty, and the Obligations of Affluence
- 4 On Helping One’s Neighbor
- 5 Moral Demandingness and Obligations to Special Relations and Self
- Conclusion
- Coda
- Appendix I
- Appendix II: Dignity, Indeterminateness of Sense, and Human Rights
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
In Chapter 4, I take up two problems. The first problem focuses on “noninstitutional” violations of people’s rights. The second problem focuses on affluent people’s positive obligations in the face of slow-moving institutional change. In response, I develop an account of negative and positive interpersonal obligations. I first argue that while we have a primary obligation to advance institutional justice, we also have interpersonal obligations that constrain our interpersonal behavior. If human rights norms don’t apply to interpersonal interactions, then a human rights theory won’t be able to account for noninstitutional violations. In response to the second problem, I draw from Peter Singer’s shallow pond example and the Parable of the Good Samaritan (Luke 10:25–37). Building on these examples, I argue that affluent people have greater obligations to severely poor people than commonsense judgments suggest.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- On Helping One's NeighborSevere Poverty and the Religious Ethics of Obligation, pp. 105 - 137Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2024