Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-77c89778f8-7drxs Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-07-21T11:55:56.944Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

Chapter 5 - Type-identity conditions for phenomenal properties

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 April 2012

Simone Gozzano
Affiliation:
Università degli Studi dell'Aquila, Italy
Christopher S. Hill
Affiliation:
Brown University, Rhode Island
Get access

Summary

This chapter argues that the crucial assumptions of Saul Kripke's argument, an objective principle of identity for mental-state types. This principle is actually compatible with both the type-identity theory of the mind and Kripke's semantics and metaphysics. The chapter presents a version of the type identity theory. The viability of the identity theory focuses on bodily sensations, such as pain and other states characterized by their phenomenal properties. According to Kripke, there is nothing in, for instance, pain which is not in apparently feeling pain. This argument has had a strong impact on the identity theory of the mind, both of the type and of the token versions. The gist of Kripke's argument has often been expressed as the idea that when it comes to pain and other bodily sensations, appearance and reality coincide. Kripke stresses that possible worlds are like stipulated situations.
Type
Chapter
Information
New Perspectives on Type Identity
The Mental and the Physical
, pp. 111 - 126
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2012

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure coreplatform@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×