Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of maps
- Acknowledgements
- Creating a revolutionary movement
- Competition and dissension within
- The drive to unify China – first phase
- Conflict over revolutionary goals
- Mounting problems for the Wuhan regime
- The communists turn to rebellion
- The final drive – Peking captured and Nanking the new capital
- Bibliographical essay
- Bibliography
- Index
The communists turn to rebellion
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 18 December 2009
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of maps
- Acknowledgements
- Creating a revolutionary movement
- Competition and dissension within
- The drive to unify China – first phase
- Conflict over revolutionary goals
- Mounting problems for the Wuhan regime
- The communists turn to rebellion
- The final drive – Peking captured and Nanking the new capital
- Bibliographical essay
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
Beginnings of communist revolt
During the latter half of July the Chinese Communist leadership debated plans for a general uprising in four provinces, with encouragement from a newly arrived Comintern delegate, Besso Lominadze, and advice from General Bluykher and some of his staff. An important element of the plan was to seize control of elements in Chang Fa-k'uei's Second Front Army that had moved into northern Kiangsi and in which there were a number of communist commanders and many communist political workers. Details for the revolt were worked out by a group of communists in Nanchang and Kiukiang, and discussed on 26 July in Hankow at a meeting of available members of the party's Central Standing Committee – Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai, who had returned with the plan, Li Wei-han, Chang T'ailei and Chang Kuo-t'ao. Lominadze and Bluykher attended together with several other Russians. The plotters hoped that Chang Fa-k'uei could be persuaded to join and lead his troops back to Kwangtung, but if not, then communists would stage a revolt and take over his troops anyway. Moscow had been informed, but at this meeting the Comintern representative reported telegraphic instructions that no Russians were to participate in the uprising, and he also said that no funds were available. Bluykher, who had held a discussion with General Chang only the day before, predicted that should he join the insurrection, there might be 30,000 troops, which would be plenty to fight through to eastern Kwangtung, at which time the communists could cut Chang out; but if the communists split his forces at Nanchang, the uprising would only gain from 5,000 to 8,000 troops.
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- Information
- The Nationalist Revolution in China, 1923–1928 , pp. 147 - 170Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 1984