Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of figures
- List of tables
- List of contributors
- Louis Phlips: a brief biography
- Introduction
- 1 Competition policy and game-theory: reflections based on the cement industry case
- 2 Legal standards and economic analysis of collusion in EC competition policy
- 3 A guided tour of the Folk Theorem
- 4 Predatory pricing and anti-dumping
- 5 Should pricing policies be regulated when firms may tacitly collude?
- 6 Tougher price competition or lower concentration: a trade-off for anti-trust authorities?
- 7 The strategic effects of supply guarantees: the raincheck game
- 8 Product market competition policy and technological performance
- 9 On some issues in the theory of competition in regulated markets
- 10 Modelling the entry and exit process in dynamic competition: an introduction to repeated-commitment models
- 11 Coordination failures in the Cournot approach to deregulated bank competition
- 12 How the adoption of a new technology is affected by the interaction between labour and product markets
- Index
11 - Coordination failures in the Cournot approach to deregulated bank competition
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 22 September 2009
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of figures
- List of tables
- List of contributors
- Louis Phlips: a brief biography
- Introduction
- 1 Competition policy and game-theory: reflections based on the cement industry case
- 2 Legal standards and economic analysis of collusion in EC competition policy
- 3 A guided tour of the Folk Theorem
- 4 Predatory pricing and anti-dumping
- 5 Should pricing policies be regulated when firms may tacitly collude?
- 6 Tougher price competition or lower concentration: a trade-off for anti-trust authorities?
- 7 The strategic effects of supply guarantees: the raincheck game
- 8 Product market competition policy and technological performance
- 9 On some issues in the theory of competition in regulated markets
- 10 Modelling the entry and exit process in dynamic competition: an introduction to repeated-commitment models
- 11 Coordination failures in the Cournot approach to deregulated bank competition
- 12 How the adoption of a new technology is affected by the interaction between labour and product markets
- Index
Summary
Introduction
Many traditional analyses of the banking sector rely on the notion of perfect competition among banks (with the notable exception of some classic contributions such as Klein, 1971, and Monti, 1972). But if, for various reasons, the sector is concentrated, and if the market power of banks comes into play, the interaction of oligopolistic strategies with the principles of prudential regulation by the central banker should be reconsidered, with the help of some well defined game-theoretic model. This, we think, would essentially be the philosophy of Louis Phlips. In his 1995 address at the meeting of the European Economic Association (see Phlips, 1996), Louis explicitly advocated a more systematic use of game-theoretic reasoning within the field of competition policy (see also Phlips, 1983). In the banking sector, prudential regulation and competition policy are in many respects intertwined, and the present chapter can be viewed as an attempt to integrate contemporary industrial organisation methods with the theory of financial intermediation.
The way to this approach has been paved by a number of forerunners, who also based their approach on imperfectly competitive models of banking.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Market Structure and Competition PolicyGame-Theoretic Approaches, pp. 232 - 270Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2000
- 2
- Cited by