Epistemology, the theory of valid grounds for belief, presupposes some picture of how the mind/brain represents anything. In Chapter 4 we naturalized pragmatism as an explanation for the rationality of belief and so proposed a cognitive epistemology. In the context of this pragmatism, we will ask whether there is a legitimate epistemological role for authority in religious and other representations with a cultural origin. In Sperber, Recanati and Peirce, acceptance into the mind of partially grasped semi-propositional form involves authority, although differently in each case. The need to analyse the nature and legitimacy of authority is a neglected task within epistemology. The view I develop is a Peircean version of Recanati's claim that semi-propositional forms don't contain defective content. Instead, the mind/brain, treating the content as grasped elsewhere, by some other mind, deferentially accepts the representation.

To summarize, in the Sperber–Recanati analysis, representations of various types are accepted into the cognitive system but held differently, in ways which reflect their origin and epistemic status. Intuitive beliefs do not involve authority. Instead, they are built of pre-formed basic concepts and/or perceptual inputs – including perceptions of inner states. They are directly included in the belief box, the set of assumptions cognitively accessible with respect to perception, action and communication. In this format, the mind/brain treats them as true, assumptions held with a degree of epistemic strength corresponding to successful past use. A much more diverse set of representations derive from communication.