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4 - Explaining the Myth of Self-Interest

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  03 May 2011

Melvin J. Lerner
Affiliation:
University of Waterloo, Ontario
Susan Clayton
Affiliation:
College of Wooster, Ohio
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Summary

It should be strikingly obvious at this point that the findings just reviewed are inconsistent with the prevailing contemporary view that manifestations of self-interested motives appear as the automatic response and shape subsequent judgments of deservingness and justice (see, e.g., Epley and Caruso, 2004; Moore and Loewenstein, 2004; Skitka et al., in press). The evidence is clear: justice imperatives in predictable circumstances automatically influence people's thoughts, feelings, and behavior. To put it baldly, there is clear and compelling evidence that egocentric and egoistic reactions are not invariably the primary automatic dominating influence. This raises the question of exactly when and how self-interested motives actually influence people's judgments of deservingness and reactions to injustice.

An important step in this ambitious project consists of critically reexamining examples of the kind of research findings that are typically employed to provide supporting evidence for these self-interest dominated theories. Do they confirm the central role of self-interest, or do they demonstrate certain methodological and interpretive shortcomings that undermine their conclusions? A reexamination of evidence that is typically cited to infer the effects of egoistic motives will be the first step in answering those questions. Upon closer examination, do those findings actually reveal people automatically and preconsciously framing, modifying, or biasing their judgments of deservingness and justice to fit their self-interested purposes?

We will not attempt an exhaustive review of the extensive array of experiments in the literature. The alternative adopted here will focus on highly cited or prototypical experiments for critical reevaluation.

Type
Chapter
Information
Justice and Self-Interest
Two Fundamental Motives
, pp. 59 - 97
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2011

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