Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Acknowledgments
- Introduction
- 1 Vehicles for accumulating capital
- 2 Insider lending and Jacksonian hostility toward banks
- 3 Engines of economic development
- 4 The decline of insider lending and the problem of determining creditworthiness
- 5 Professionalization and specialization
- 6 The merger movement in banking
- Conclusion
- Index
- Plate section
4 - The decline of insider lending and the problem of determining creditworthiness
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 06 July 2010
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Acknowledgments
- Introduction
- 1 Vehicles for accumulating capital
- 2 Insider lending and Jacksonian hostility toward banks
- 3 Engines of economic development
- 4 The decline of insider lending and the problem of determining creditworthiness
- 5 Professionalization and specialization
- 6 The merger movement in banking
- Conclusion
- Index
- Plate section
Summary
Many bank officers have no careful system of investigating the credit of those who borrow money, and simply rely on their intuition, so to speak, or some evidence which has descended to them from the past record of the customer.
James G. CannonHowever well the banking system based on insider lending functioned, it was not destined to last very long. By the post–Civil War period, economic development and the tremendous expansion that occurred in the number and size of banks had transformed New England from a capitalscarce into a capital-rich economy. Development also reduced the risks involved in specialization, making it easier for firms to raise funds for their ventures without the assistance of financial intermediaries. Both these changes operated in turn to reduce the incidence of insider lending. Because funds were now more widely available, bank directors had less need to draw on their own institutions for loans. Although it was still common for directors to obtain substantial loans from their banks, and although some banks continued to operate primarily in the interests of their managers, the proportion of loans that were granted to insiders seems generally to have declined. For example, reports from national bank examiners to the Comptroller of the Currency indicate that Boston bank directors accounted on average for only about 9 percent of their banks' loans during the early 1890s, with a range of between 1 and 22 percent.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Insider LendingBanks, Personal Connections, and Economic Development in Industrial New England, pp. 84 - 106Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 1994