In spite of the Russian decision, there could be no question of abandoning Italy. The British offensive in the Western Desert had already necessitated the reinforcement of the Italians in North Africa; it still remained imperative, if the attack on Russia was to proceed unhindered, to hold the southern front. This need, indeed, seemed greater than it was; for, even when their initial alarm subsided, both Hitler and the Naval Staff over-estimated the scale, if not the potential danger, of the British thrust.

Raeder exaggerated it partly in a last attempt to get Hitler to reverse his Russian decision, partly to underline the foresight of his earlier warnings.

The fears of the Naval Staff [he complained on 27 December 1940] regarding unfavourable developments in the Eastern Mediterranean have proved justified. The enemy has assumed the initiative at all points and is everywhere conducting successful offensive actions as a result of Italy's serious strategic blunders. The Naval Staff views developments in the Mediterranean with grave misgivings. … The threat to Egypt, and thus to Britain's position in the entire Mediterranean, Near East and African areas, has been eliminated at one stroke.… It is no longer possible to drive the British Fleet from the Mediterranean, as was continually demanded by the Naval Staff, who considered this step vital to the outcome of the War.

But urgent measures were still necessary to stop the rot.

Hitler had no grounds for disagreeing with Raeder, either about the dangers or about the need for action. He knew Italy's weakness, he feared her treachery: ‘there is a complete lack of leadership in Italy; the Royal House is pro-British’. But the uncertainty of the Italian position only made it more necessary for Germany to come to Italy's aid. He was already ‘considering where German action would be most effective’. At their next meeting, on 8 and 9 January 1941, he was convinced that ‘it is vital for the outcome of the War that Italy does not collapse’; he was ‘determined to do all in his power to prevent Italy from losing North Africa’; he was ‘firmly determined to give the Italians support’.