Book contents
- Heidegger’s Social Ontology
- Modern European Philosophy
- Heidegger’s Social Ontology
- Copyright page
- Epigraph
- Contents
- Acknowledgements
- Abbreviations of Works by Heidegger
- Introduction
- Part I Being-In-the-World and Being-With
- Chapter 1 What Is Social Ontology?
- Chapter 2 Transcendental Social Ontology in Husserl and Heidegger
- Chapter 3 Holism and Relativism
- Part II Forms of Being-With
- Part III Politics and Authenticity
- Bibliography
- Index
Chapter 3 - Holism and Relativism
from Part I - Being-In-the-World and Being-With
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 18 February 2023
- Heidegger’s Social Ontology
- Modern European Philosophy
- Heidegger’s Social Ontology
- Copyright page
- Epigraph
- Contents
- Acknowledgements
- Abbreviations of Works by Heidegger
- Introduction
- Part I Being-In-the-World and Being-With
- Chapter 1 What Is Social Ontology?
- Chapter 2 Transcendental Social Ontology in Husserl and Heidegger
- Chapter 3 Holism and Relativism
- Part II Forms of Being-With
- Part III Politics and Authenticity
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
This chapter discusses whether Heidegger’s holism – roughly, the view that the meaning of the parts (entities) depends on the whole (the world) – entails a vicious relativism. I argue that Heidegger is a holist because he is committed to both object externalism (the view that intentional states depend on environmental objects) and social externalism (the view that intentional states depend on other people). Whether his holism entails relativism depends on how we understand these two commitments. Discussing recent interpretations of Heidegger’s holism (Lafont, Dreyfus, Okrent, Carman), I argue that Heidegger’s holism entails a form of relativism only if we take his social externalism to be a function of social conventions. I then go on to challenge that this is the case by arguing that Heidegger is an open-ended social externalist according to whom intentional states do not depend solely on our relation to social conventions (or any other particular social formation such as language or tradition) but on our on-going social interaction broadly construed.
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- Heidegger's Social OntologyThe Phenomenology of Self, World, and Others, pp. 68 - 96Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2022