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4 - Is language modular?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 June 2012

David F. Armstrong
Affiliation:
Gallaudet University, Washington DC
William C. Stokoe
Affiliation:
Gallaudet University, Washington DC
Sherman E. Wilcox
Affiliation:
University of New Mexico
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Summary

Faculty psychology is getting to be respectable again after centuries of hanging around with phrenologists and other dubious types.

Jerry Fodor, The modularity of mind

MODULAR VERSUS ASSOCIATIONIST THEORIES OF LANGUAGE

There is a recent version of the nativist theory of language that makes use of the modern concept of modularity, a concept derived from the construction of electronic devices, especially computers. According to modular theories, the brain can be understood as a processing device that contains a number of innately differentiated components, modules, each of which is responsible for a separate subroutine or type of computing activity. Modular theories are in contrast with associationist theories, which assume that the brain is relatively homogeneous and its interconnections are relatively unconstrained but become differentiated primarily through the organism's interactions with the environment. Modular theorists ordinarily cite regularities in human behavior, especially language, as evidence for innately determined mechanisms; while associationists have traditionally cited the great diversity of human languages and cultures as evidence for plasticity.

Precursors of modular as well as associationist theories of the causation of human behavior have very long histories in Western thought. Modular theories have been associated with the idealist tradition in philosophy (largely French), and associationist theories have been linked with the empiricist tradition (largely English). The fundamental issue is the opposition of the notion that all ideas (concepts) must be pre-programmed or built in, as against the observable plasticity and flexibility of the organism.

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Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 1995

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