This chapter begins with a survey of the young Newton’s early exposure to experimental philosophy and then turns to the emergence of experimental pedagogy in the last years of the seventeenth century and its rapid expansion in the early decades of the century that followed. The proliferation of courses in experimental philosophy, both public and university-based, in Oxford, Cambridge, London, and St Andrews, is testimony to its success and legitimacy. So much so, we argue, that when his commitment to universal gravity came under attack by Continental detractors, Newton openly and very strategically aligned himself with experimental philosophy, in part because of the credibility that this approach to natural philosophy already possessed. This is not to claim that every Newtonian was partial to experimental philosophy, and in this chapter we examine the views of one opponent, the Oxford natural philosopher John Keill. We document the process by which Newton publicly declared himself to be an experimental philosopher in the second edition of the Principia of 1713, and then go on to examine his role in the eclipse of Baconian natural history.