Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Contributors
- Acknowledgments
- In Memoriam
- Introduction
- PART I OPERATIONAL ISSUES IN MODERN CENTRAL BANKING
- PART II MONETARY UNION
- PART III PRIVATE ALTERNATIVES TO CENTRAL BANKS
- 5 Banking Panics and the Origin of Central Banking
- Commentary
- 6 Establishing a Monetary Union in the United States
- Commentary
- 7 Currency Competition in the Digital Age
- Commentary
- Index
Commentary
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 31 July 2009
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Contributors
- Acknowledgments
- In Memoriam
- Introduction
- PART I OPERATIONAL ISSUES IN MODERN CENTRAL BANKING
- PART II MONETARY UNION
- PART III PRIVATE ALTERNATIVES TO CENTRAL BANKS
- 5 Banking Panics and the Origin of Central Banking
- Commentary
- 6 Establishing a Monetary Union in the United States
- Commentary
- 7 Currency Competition in the Digital Age
- Commentary
- Index
Summary
This very interesting paper by Randy Kroszner has two parts. The first part sketches a novel theory, namely that competition from foreign currencies (such as the U.S. dollar and the deutschmark) has helped to reduce worldwide inflation in recent years. The second part speculates on the future of financial innovation and the potential for private monies to become an increasingly important substitute for central bank money. In my comments, I will focus on the first part of the paper.
As I understand it, Kroszner's theoretical story goes something like this: Governments like to raise revenue through seigniorage. When private agents have no alternatives to domestic central bank money for their transactional needs, it is easy for the government to engage in seigniorage. In contrast, when agents can switch to dollars, for example, when making transactions, the government cannot raise as much seigniorage revenue for a given amount of inflation. If we further assume that the government trades the benefits of seigniorage against some other (unspecified) costs of inflation in a fixed way, it should inflate less.
An example may help to illustrate the logic behind the theory. In scenario A, imagine that Russian households initially hold 100 rubles as their only form of transaction balance, and the only good in the Russian economy is 100 units of corn. The price of corn is one ruble. Starting from this position, suppose the Russian central bank prints 100 more rubles. The government will extract real seigniorage revenue equal to 50 units of corn and the price level will double, so that each unit of corn now costs two rubles.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Evolution and Procedures in Central Banking , pp. 297 - 304Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2003