In Chapter 1, we attempted to contextualize the many different appearances of pluralism across disciplines. In Chapter 2, we focused on its uses and definitions in contemporary psychology, mapping out various contexts and meanings associated with pluralism that have been offered over the past several decades. Then, in Chapters 3 and 4, we analyzed and discussed James’s definitions and uses of pluralism concepts. We also made clear that the term “pluralism” betrays a complex and intricate web of different yet intertwined concepts that extend at least to three distinct realms: the ontological, the epistemological, and the ethical. Now, based on all this review and analysis, we turn to a broad comparison of forms of pluralism in contemporary psychology and in William James. Our goal is to consider both how other authors have understood the implications of pluralism for contemporary psychology, and to analyze some features of James’s pluralistic philosophy for psychological metatheory that have not received detailed treatment in the literature. As a disclaimer, our intent is not to offer a map or model of what pluralism in psychology would look like in practice.