Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- Table of cases
- 1 Introduction: the mapping of legal concepts
- 2 Johanna Wagner and the rival opera houses
- 3 Liability for economic harms
- 4 Reliance
- 5 Liability for physical harms
- 6 Profits derived from wrongs
- 7 Domestic obligations
- 8 Interrelation of obligations
- 9 Property and obligation
- 10 Public interest and private right
- 11 Conclusion: the concept of legal mapping
- Works cited
- Index
6 - Profits derived from wrongs
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 15 July 2009
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- Table of cases
- 1 Introduction: the mapping of legal concepts
- 2 Johanna Wagner and the rival opera houses
- 3 Liability for economic harms
- 4 Reliance
- 5 Liability for physical harms
- 6 Profits derived from wrongs
- 7 Domestic obligations
- 8 Interrelation of obligations
- 9 Property and obligation
- 10 Public interest and private right
- 11 Conclusion: the concept of legal mapping
- Works cited
- Index
Summary
Sometimes a benefit is derived from a legal wrong that does not cause – or that does not appear to cause – any corresponding loss. The question whether such benefits must be given up, and if so for what reason, has caused much conceptual agonizing; it is an issue that has been found impossible to classify, cutting across the legal categories of contract, tort, property, and unjust enrichment, and often involving general considerations of public policy. An example is the well-known Kentucky case of Edwards v. Lee's Administrator (1936), where the defendant profited by admitting tourists to see a spectacular cave that was partly underneath the plaintiff's land, though only accessible from the defendant's. The court held that the plaintiff, though not himself in a position to profit from the cave, was entitled to recover a reasonable portion of the defendant's profits. Similarly, a person might use a corner of his neighbour's land without permission for access to a building site, saving himself substantial construction costs, but doing no damage to the land. Or, to take an older example, the plaintiff keeps horses for hire, and the defendant takes one out without permission, and brings it back unharmed. Can he say, in answer to a claim for money, ‘Against what loss do you want to be restored? I restore the horse. There is no loss. The horse is none the worse; it is the better for the exercise’?
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Dimensions of Private LawCategories and Concepts in Anglo-American Legal Reasoning, pp. 107 - 126Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2003