Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Note on Sources and Texts
- Introduction
- 1 On Whether or Not the Florentines Should Wage War against the Church
- 2 On Whether or Not the Florentines Should Accept the Peace Agreement that the Duke of Milan is Offering
- 3 On Whether or Not the Florentines Should Launch a War of Aggression against Lucca
- 4 On Whether or Not the King of France Should Make Peace with the Duke of Milan
- 5 On Whether or Not the Venetians Should Sign an Offensive Alliance with the King of France
- 6 On Whether the Venetians Should Ally with the King of the Romans or Stick to the Alliance with the King of France
- 7 On Whether the Venetians Should Ally with the Emperor or Stick to the Alliance with the King of France
- 8 On Whether the Emperor Should Be Magnanimous towards the King of France, Whom He Holds Prisoner, or Impose Severe Terms on Him
- 9 On Whether or Not the Venetians Should Make an Agreement with the Emperor or Risk War against Him
- 10 On Whether the Pope Should Make an Agreement with the Emperor or Wage War against Him
- 11 On Whether the Emperor Should Make an Agreement with the Italian States or the King of France
- Name index
- Subject index
11 - On Whether the Emperor Should Make an Agreement with the Italian States or the King of France
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 26 April 2017
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Note on Sources and Texts
- Introduction
- 1 On Whether or Not the Florentines Should Wage War against the Church
- 2 On Whether or Not the Florentines Should Accept the Peace Agreement that the Duke of Milan is Offering
- 3 On Whether or Not the Florentines Should Launch a War of Aggression against Lucca
- 4 On Whether or Not the King of France Should Make Peace with the Duke of Milan
- 5 On Whether or Not the Venetians Should Sign an Offensive Alliance with the King of France
- 6 On Whether the Venetians Should Ally with the King of the Romans or Stick to the Alliance with the King of France
- 7 On Whether the Venetians Should Ally with the Emperor or Stick to the Alliance with the King of France
- 8 On Whether the Emperor Should Be Magnanimous towards the King of France, Whom He Holds Prisoner, or Impose Severe Terms on Him
- 9 On Whether or Not the Venetians Should Make an Agreement with the Emperor or Risk War against Him
- 10 On Whether the Pope Should Make an Agreement with the Emperor or Wage War against Him
- 11 On Whether the Emperor Should Make an Agreement with the Italian States or the King of France
- Name index
- Subject index
Summary
Although the French defeat at Pavia and the capture of King Francis I (24 February 1525) had placed Charles V in a position of uncontested superiority in Italy, the Emperor was not inclined to proceed now to a direct subjugation of the Italian states. His chronic lack of money made it imperative to find, first of all, the necessary financial resources to pay his troops; in addition, his desire to impose an unconditional surrender on France (see above, Chapter 8.) suggested that this was not the right time to risk an open conflict with the Italians. The latter, for their part, were holding their breath. According to Guicciardini,
all the potentates of Italy who, finding themselves in a manner wholly disarmed, were struck with the greatest terror at the thoughts of Caesar having so very powerful an army in the field, without an enemy to oppose him. Nor were their fears so much allayed by what many reported of Caesar's good disposition and inclination to peace, without any desire of usurping the states of others, as they were increased on the consideration of the danger that, moved either by ambition, a passion natural to all princes, or by that insolence which commonly attends victories, and besides instigated by the forward zeal of those who had the management of his affairs in Italy or, lastly, stimulated by his Council and whole Court, he would not neglect so fair an opportunity, of itself sufficient to warm the coldest disposition, to turn his whole thoughts on making himself lord of all Italy, especially as they did not ignore how easy it was for any great prince, and much more for a Roman Emperor, to justify their undertakings under pretences which might have the appearance of reason and honour. (The History of Italy, XVI, i)
Francesco Sforza was given the Duchy of Milan back – although his position was far from solid, for the imperial army was still in Lombardy and he had not received the formal investiture yet. Simultaneously, Charles opened negotiations with Pope Clement VII and the Venetians and accepted a number of minor Italian states under his protection.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Debating Foreign Policy in the RenaissanceSpeeches on War and Peace by Francesco Guicciardini, pp. 166 - 180Publisher: Edinburgh University PressPrint publication year: 2017