Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Dedication
- Contents
- List of Figures
- List of Tables
- Preface
- Acknowledgments
- 1 Reform in an imperfect world
- 2 “Deep democratization” and the control of corruption
- 3 First, do no harm – then, build trust: reform in fragile and post-conflict societies
- 4 Official Moguls: power, protection . . . and profits
- 5 Oligarchs and Clans: high stakes and insecurity
- 6 Elite Cartels: hanging on with a little help from my friends
- 7 Influence Market corruption: wealth and power versus justice
- 8 Staying power: building and sustaining citizen engagement
- Appendix Recognizing the syndromes of corruption
- References
- Index
Preface
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 June 2014
- Frontmatter
- Dedication
- Contents
- List of Figures
- List of Tables
- Preface
- Acknowledgments
- 1 Reform in an imperfect world
- 2 “Deep democratization” and the control of corruption
- 3 First, do no harm – then, build trust: reform in fragile and post-conflict societies
- 4 Official Moguls: power, protection . . . and profits
- 5 Oligarchs and Clans: high stakes and insecurity
- 6 Elite Cartels: hanging on with a little help from my friends
- 7 Influence Market corruption: wealth and power versus justice
- 8 Staying power: building and sustaining citizen engagement
- Appendix Recognizing the syndromes of corruption
- References
- Index
Summary
Preface
Today a child will not be vaccinated against contagious diseases. A family will not have clean water. A young university graduate will not be given a fair shot at a job for which she is well trained. A small business owner will pay inspectors to avoid large fines for health and safety violations that do not exist, while a nightclub owner across the street pays other inspectors to ignore the fact that fire exits are blocked. A journalist with solid evidence about problems in regional government will wonder why his editor shows no interest in publishing the story. A local investor with a plan for improving a poor neighborhood will be denied essential licenses and permits – again. A young opposition leader will search for support against long-time incumbents who have campaign budgets several times as large as his. A researcher whose university laboratory is funded by a large corporation will publish findings friendly to that company’s interests. A banker with a track record of making bad loans will be thinking about ways of spending a large bonus. A general from a developing country will close the deal on the purchase of a townhouse in the 16th arrondissement of Paris – using funds intended to support vaccinations for small children.
These scenarios and many more like them will play out in societies around the world, rich and poor, democratic and authoritarian. More often than in years past they may eventually make headlines, and draw the attention of citizens, journalists, organizations, and officials determined to reduce abuses of wealth and power. In time a few of the perpetrators and beneficiaries of such schemes might even go to jail. Yet the overall pattern of benefits for the “haves” at the expense of the have-nots is unlikely to change. Corruption is far from the only cause of that pattern; perfectly honest and transparent government might become a global reality tomorrow, and yet the next day, or next year, would not necessarily be very different. Indeed, some of the events above do not clearly fit most people’s conceptions of corruption, although I will try to make a case in chapters to come that they have key elements in common.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Corruption, Contention, and ReformThe Power of Deep Democratization, pp. xi - xiiiPublisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2013