In ‘Doing Things with Concepts in Sextus Empiricus’, Richard Bett examines Sextus’ terminology in connection to his use of such strategies and highlights their inventiveness and sophistication. On the one hand, Sextus appears to agree with his dogmatic opponents insofar as he says that we need to get our concepts clear before investigating any topic. On the other hand, he often raises objections against dogmatic concepts, arguing, for instance, that they are inherently inconsistent and therefore there are no objects corresponding to such concepts or, alternatively, that even if we accept these concepts, there exists nothing real corresponding to them. It is not clear whether or how these two lines of approach can be coherently combined. Nonetheless, Sextus frequently runs the two together, and Bett enquires into his reasons for doing so. An important upshot of this study is that it leads us to consider what kinds of concepts and what sort of reflection about concepts are available to a sceptic of Sextus’ variety.