Skip to main content Accessibility help
Hostname: page-component-7d8f8d645b-p72pn Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2023-05-29T23:10:04.569Z Has data issue: false Feature Flags: { "useRatesEcommerce": true } hasContentIssue false

53 - Decision Theory

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 December 2017

Sacha Golob
King's College London
Jens Timmermann
University of St Andrews, Scotland
Get access
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2017

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)


Angner, Erik 2004. “Revisiting Rawls: A Theory of Justice in the Light of Levi’s Theory of Decision,” Theoria 70: 321.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bratman, Michael E. 2013. “The Interplay of Intention and Reason,” Ethics 123: 657–72.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Brink, David 1993. “The Separateness of Persons, Distributive Norms, and Moral Theory,” in Frey, R.G. and Morris, Christopher W. (eds.), Value, Welfare, and Morality, Cambridge University Press, pp. 252–89.Google Scholar
Broad, C.D. 1916. “On the Function of False Hypotheses in Ethics,” International Journal of Ethics 26: 377–97.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Broome, John 1991. Weighing Goods: Equality, Uncertainty and Time. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.Google Scholar
Byron, Michael (ed.) 2004. Satisficing and Maximizing: Moral Theorists on Practical Reason. Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Dreier, James 2004. “Decision Theory and Morality,” in Mele, Alfred R. and Rawling, Piers (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Rationality, Oxford University Press, pp. 156–81.*Google Scholar
Elster, Jon and Roemer, John E. (eds.) 1991. Interpersonal Comparisons of Well-Being. Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Finkelstein, Claire 2013. “Pragmatic Rationality and Risk,” Ethics 123: 673–99.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gauthier, David 1965. “Rule-Utilitarianism and Randomization,” Analysis 25: 68–9.Google Scholar
Gauthier, David 1986. Morals by Agreement. Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Gauthier, David 1994. “Assure and Threaten,” Ethics 104: 690721.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gauthier, David 1998. “Rethinking the Toxin Puzzle,” in Coleman, Jules L. and Morris, Christopher W. (eds.), Rational Commitment and Social Justice: Essays for Gregory Kavka, Cambridge University Press, pp. 4758.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gauthier, David 2013. “Twenty-Five On,” Ethics 123: 601–24.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hansson, Sven Ove 2010. “The Harmful Influence of Decision Theory on Ethics,” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 13: 585–93.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Harsanyi, John C. 1953. “Cardinal Utility in Welfare Economics and in the Theory of Risk-Taking,” Journal of Political Economy 61: 434–5.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Harsanyi, John C. 1955. “Cardinal Welfare, Individualistic Ethics, and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility,” Journal of Political Economy 63: 309–21.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Harsanyi, John C. 1977. Rational Behaviour and Bargaining Equilibrium in Games and Social Situations. Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Harsanyi, John C. 1982. “Morality and the Theory of Rational Behaviour,” in Sen, Amartya and Williams, Bernard (eds.), Utilitarianism and Beyond, Cambridge University Press, pp. 3962.Google Scholar
Harsanyi, John C. 1998. “A Preference-Based Theory of Well-Being and a Rule-Utilitarian Theory of Morality,” in Leinfellner, Werner and Köhler, Eckehart (eds.), Game Theory, Experience, Rationality: Foundations of Social Sciences, Economics and Ethics in Honor of John C. Harsanyi, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, pp. 285300.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hooker, Brad 2000. Ideal Code, Real World: A Rule-consequentialist Theory of Morality. Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Jackson, Frank 1991. “Decision-theoretic Consequentialism and the Nearest and Dearest Objection,” Ethics 101: 461–82.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lumer, Christoph 2010a. “Introduction: The Relevance of Rational Decision Theory for Ethics,” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 13: 485–96.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lumer, Christoph 2010b. “Moral Desirability and Rational Decision,” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 13: 561–84.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lyons, David 1965. Forms and Limits of Utilitarianism. Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
MacIntosh, Duncan 1988. “Libertarian Agency and Rational Morality: Action-Theoretical Objections to Gauthier’s Dispositional Solution of the Compliance Problem,” The Southern Journal of Philosophy 26: 499525.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
MacIntosh, Duncan 2013. “Assuring, Threatening, a Fully Maximizing Theory of Practical Rationality, and the Practical Duties of Agents,” Ethics 123: 625–56.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
McClennen, Edward F. 1990. Rationality and Dynamic Choice: Foundational Explorations. Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
McClennen, Edward F. 1997. “Pragmatic Rationality and Rules,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 26: 210–58.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
McClennen, Edward F. 2010. “Rational Choice and Moral Theory,” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 13: 521–40.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Morris, Christopher W. 2013. “Introduction,” Ethics 123: 595600.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Narveson, Jan 2010. “The Relevance of Decision Theory to Ethical Theory,” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 13: 497520.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Pettit, Philip 1984. “Satisficing Consequentialism,” part II, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society supplementary volume 58: 165–76.Google Scholar
Rawls, John 1958. “Justice as Fairness,” The Philosophical Review 67: 164–94.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Rawls, John 1971. A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Risse, Mathias 2002. “Harsanyi’s ‘Utilitarian Theorem’ and Utilitarianism,” Noûs 36: 550–77.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Roemer, John E. 1996. Theories of Distributive Justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Roemer, John E. 2008. “Harsanyi’s Impartial Observer Is Not a Utilitarian,” in Fleurbaey, Marc, Salles, Maurice, and Weymark, John A. (eds.), Justice, Political Liberalism, and Utilitarianism: Themes from Harsanyi and Rawls, Cambridge University Press, pp. 129–35.Google Scholar
Slote, Michael 1984. “Satisficing Consequentialism,” part I, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society supplementary volume 58: 139–63.Google Scholar
Smart, J.J.C. 1956. “Extreme and Restricted Utilitarianism,” The Philosophical Quarterly 6: 344–54.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Smart, J.J.C. 1961. An Outline of a System of Utilitarian Ethics. Melbourne University Press.Google Scholar
Smart, J.J.C. 1973. “An Outline of a System of Utilitarian Ethics,” in Smart, J.J.C. and Williams, Bernard, Utilitarianism: For and Against, Cambridge University Press, pp. 374.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Uzan-Milofsky, Marie 2009. “Shall We Be Resolute?Rationality and Society 21: 337–57.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
van Donselaar, Gijs 2013. “Sticks or Carrots? The Emergence of Self-Ownership,” Ethics 123: 700–16.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
van Roojen, Mark 2008. “Some Advantages of One Form of Argument for the Maximin Principle,” Acta Analytica 23: 319–35.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Verbeek, Bruno 2010. “Rational Choice Virtues,” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 13: 541–59.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Zwolinski, Matt 2008. “The Separateness of Persons and Liberal Theory,” The Journal of Value Inquiry 42: 147–65.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the or variations. ‘’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats