Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Introduction
- I Medieval philosophical literature
- II Aristotle in the middle ages
- III The old logic
- IV Logic in the high middle ages: semantic theory
- V Logic in the high middle ages: propositions and modalities
- VI Metaphysics and epistemology
- VII Natural philosophy
- VIII Philosophy of mind and action
- 29 The potential and the agent intellect
- 30 Sense, intellect, and imagination in Albert, Thomas, and Siger
- 31 Criticisms of Aristotelian psychology and the Augustinian–Aristotelian synthesis
- 32 Free will and free choice
- 33 Thomas Aquinas on human action
- IX Ethics
- X Politics
- XI The defeat, neglect, and revival of scholasticism
- Index nominum
- Index rerum
- References
30 - Sense, intellect, and imagination in Albert, Thomas, and Siger
from VIII - Philosophy of mind and action
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 28 March 2008
- Frontmatter
- Introduction
- I Medieval philosophical literature
- II Aristotle in the middle ages
- III The old logic
- IV Logic in the high middle ages: semantic theory
- V Logic in the high middle ages: propositions and modalities
- VI Metaphysics and epistemology
- VII Natural philosophy
- VIII Philosophy of mind and action
- 29 The potential and the agent intellect
- 30 Sense, intellect, and imagination in Albert, Thomas, and Siger
- 31 Criticisms of Aristotelian psychology and the Augustinian–Aristotelian synthesis
- 32 Free will and free choice
- 33 Thomas Aquinas on human action
- IX Ethics
- X Politics
- XI The defeat, neglect, and revival of scholasticism
- Index nominum
- Index rerum
- References
Summary
Albert the Great
Albert the Great reveals the influence of Avicenna and Averroes in his psychology, though he certainly does not agree with them on all points. Although he maintains that sense as such is a material and passive power, Albert admits that after it has been actualised by the sensible form, it can make judgements. However, it appears to do so only through the common sense. Albert rejects the argument that just as there is in the soul an agent intellect which abstracts and thus actualises intelligible species so there must be an active sense which abstracts and thus actualises the sensible. He replies that it is something in the nature of the intellect which renders the potentially intelligible actually intelligible, but it is something in external reality, not anything in the powers of the soul, which renders material things actually sensible. However, what is in the sense is certainly not the form united in existence with matter as found in the external thing, but rather an intention (intentio) or species of the material thing which enables us to have sense knowledge of that thing. Since sense apprehends the sensible object through such an intention, the first grade of abstraction is found in sensation, namely, separation from the matter of the external thing. However, in so far as sensation is of actually existing sensible things, which are individuated by matter, there must remain in sense apprehension a reference to matter as present and to the individuating conditions of matter.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- The Cambridge History of Later Medieval PhilosophyFrom the Rediscovery of Aristotle to the Disintegration of Scholasticism, 1100–1600, pp. 602 - 622Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 1982
References
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