Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- 1 Aspects of the development of the history of science
- 2 History of science
- 3 Objectives and justification
- 4 Elements of theory of history
- 5 Objectivity in history
- 6 Explanations
- 7 Hypothetical history
- 8 Structure and organization
- 9 Anachronical and diachronical history of science
- 10 Ideology and myths in the history of science
- 11 Sources
- 12 Evaluation of source materials
- 13 Scientists' histories
- 14 Experimental history of science
- 15 The biographical approach
- 16 Prosopography
- 17 Scientometric historiography
- Notes
- Bibliography
- Index
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- 1 Aspects of the development of the history of science
- 2 History of science
- 3 Objectives and justification
- 4 Elements of theory of history
- 5 Objectivity in history
- 6 Explanations
- 7 Hypothetical history
- 8 Structure and organization
- 9 Anachronical and diachronical history of science
- 10 Ideology and myths in the history of science
- 11 Sources
- 12 Evaluation of source materials
- 13 Scientists' histories
- 14 Experimental history of science
- 15 The biographical approach
- 16 Prosopography
- 17 Scientometric historiography
- Notes
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
A very considerable part of history of science is descriptive, that is, accounts of what occurrences took place and when they happened. In spite of this practice, almost all historians agree that history ought also to be explanatory. A pure description of the past will not qualify as real history but is what is somewhat condescendingly called chronicle writing.
Obviously, not all occurrences are in need of an explanation. In particular, it is the novel, non-trivial occurrences that we want to explain by grounding them in relatively familiar and known experiences. In the first instance, scientific occurrences ought to be evaluated and explained in accordance with the norm or norms prevailing at the time they took place. A period's norm can be regarded as everything that is taken for granted by the scientific community during that period. In this respect, the identification of the norms of a period is important. According to David Knight, ‘the recovery of the norm [is] itself interesting and must be the primary task of the historian’.
When a particular norm has been identified it can in itself constitute a basis for explanation. If we ask why a theory was accepted or why an experiment was interpreted in a particular way, a reference to the fact that it was in agreement with prevailing standards can in itself be an explanation. In contrast, a norm-breaking occurrence needs an explanation of its own. The norms that are used as a basis for explanation in such cases should, of course, be the norms of that time, not ours.
There are two main types of suggestion for what should count as an historical explanation.
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- An Introduction to the Historiography of Science , pp. 61 - 69Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 1987