Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Introduction
- Chronology
- Further reading
- Note on the text
- Abbreviations
- The Theory of Moral Sentiments
- Advertisement
- Contents
- Part I Of the propriety of action
- Part II Of merit and demerit; or, of the objects of reward and punishment
- Part III Of the foundation of our judgments concerning our own sentiments and conduct, and of the sense of duty
- Part IV Of the effect of utility upon the sentiment of approbation
- Part V Of the influence of custom and fashion upon the sentiments of moral approbation and disapprobation
- Part VI Of the character of virtue
- Part VII Of systems of moral philosophy
- Index
- Cambridge texts in the history of philosophy
Part I - Of the propriety of action
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 June 2012
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Introduction
- Chronology
- Further reading
- Note on the text
- Abbreviations
- The Theory of Moral Sentiments
- Advertisement
- Contents
- Part I Of the propriety of action
- Part II Of merit and demerit; or, of the objects of reward and punishment
- Part III Of the foundation of our judgments concerning our own sentiments and conduct, and of the sense of duty
- Part IV Of the effect of utility upon the sentiment of approbation
- Part V Of the influence of custom and fashion upon the sentiments of moral approbation and disapprobation
- Part VI Of the character of virtue
- Part VII Of systems of moral philosophy
- Index
- Cambridge texts in the history of philosophy
Summary
Of the sense of propriety
Of sympathy
1 How selfish soever man may be supposed, there are evidently some principles in his nature, which interest him in the fortune of others, and render their happiness necessary to him, though he derives nothing from it except the pleasure of seeing it. Of this kind is pity or compassion, the emotion which we feel for the misery of others, when we either see it, or are made to conceive it in a very lively manner. That we often derive sorrow from the sorrow of others, is a matter of fact too obvious to require any instances to prove it; for this sentiment, like all the other original passions of human nature, is by no means confined to the virtuous and humane, though they perhaps may feel it with the most exquisite sensibility. The greatest ruffian, the most hardened violator of the laws of society, is not altogether without it.
2 As we have no immediate experience of what other men feel, we can form no idea of the manner in which they are affected, but by conceiving what we ourselves should feel in the like situation. Though our brother is upon the rack, as long as we ourselves are at our ease, our senses will never inform us of what he suffers. They never did, and never can, carry us beyond our own person, and it is by the imagination only that we can form any conception of what are his sensations.
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- Adam Smith: The Theory of Moral Sentiments , pp. 11 - 77Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2002