Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Introduction
- Chronology
- Further reading
- Note on the text
- Abbreviations
- The Theory of Moral Sentiments
- Advertisement
- Contents
- Part I Of the propriety of action
- Part II Of merit and demerit; or, of the objects of reward and punishment
- Part III Of the foundation of our judgments concerning our own sentiments and conduct, and of the sense of duty
- Part IV Of the effect of utility upon the sentiment of approbation
- Part V Of the influence of custom and fashion upon the sentiments of moral approbation and disapprobation
- Part VI Of the character of virtue
- Part VII Of systems of moral philosophy
- Index
- Cambridge texts in the history of philosophy
Part III - Of the foundation of our judgments concerning our own sentiments and conduct, and of the sense of duty
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 June 2012
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Introduction
- Chronology
- Further reading
- Note on the text
- Abbreviations
- The Theory of Moral Sentiments
- Advertisement
- Contents
- Part I Of the propriety of action
- Part II Of merit and demerit; or, of the objects of reward and punishment
- Part III Of the foundation of our judgments concerning our own sentiments and conduct, and of the sense of duty
- Part IV Of the effect of utility upon the sentiment of approbation
- Part V Of the influence of custom and fashion upon the sentiments of moral approbation and disapprobation
- Part VI Of the character of virtue
- Part VII Of systems of moral philosophy
- Index
- Cambridge texts in the history of philosophy
Summary
Of the principle of self-approbation and of self-disapprobation
1 In the two foregoing parts of this discourse, I have chiefly considered the origin and foundation of our judgments concerning the sentiments and conduct of others. I come now to consider more particularly the origin of those concerning our own.
2 The principle by which we naturally either approve or disapprove of our own conduct, seems to be altogether the same with that by which we exercise the like judgments concerning the conduct of other people. We either approve or disapprove of the conduct of another man according as we feel that, when we bring his case home to ourselves, we either can or cannot entirely sympathize with the sentiments and motives which directed it. And, in the same manner, we either approve or disapprove of our own conduct, according as we feel that, when we place ourselves in the situation of another man, and view it, as it were, with his eyes and from his station, we either can or cannot entirely enter into and sympathize with the sentiments and motives which influenced it. We can never survey our own sentiments and motives, we can never form any judgment concerning them; unless we remove ourselves, as it were, from our own natural station, and endeavour to view them as at a certain distance from us. But we can do this in no other way than by endeavouring to view them with the eyes of other people, or as other people are likely to view them.
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- Adam Smith: The Theory of Moral Sentiments , pp. 128 - 208Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2002